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The Role of Non-Profit Organizations in
Shaping Food Law and Corporate
Responsibility in the United States
Melissa M. Card

INTRODUCTION
Disputes between Europe and the United States over real
and perceived concerns about food safety demonstrate different
perspectives on corporate responsibility and different
institutional processes for settling those differences.1 For
example, in the United States, a bill concerning genetically
engineered labeling was sponsored and drafted by the Senate
Agriculture Committee focusing on industry needs.2 However,
Europe adopted a labeling approach for genetically engineered
products based on input from various non-profit organizations
focusing on consumers’ concerns.3
Non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) are assumed to
be counterweight to capitalism and globalization.4 NGOs
promote what they perceive to be more ethical and socially


Melissa M. Card J.D., Associate Director of the Institute for Food Laws and
Regulations at Michigan State University, and Adjunct Professor for Michigan State
University College of Law. Copyright 2017: all rights reserved, no part of this document
may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means.
1. Compare Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419,
1995 WL 360309, at *1 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994), vacated sub nom. Liebeck v.
Restaurants (N.M. Dist. Nov. 28, 1994) (exemplifying the litigious society of the United
States, in which consumers hold corporations responsible), with DAVID VOGEL, THE
MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 8 (2006) (declaring that interest in Corporate Social Responsibility exists
on the European continent).
2. Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 § 202, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (1946).
3. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24 (EU).
4. See Jonathan P. Doh & Terrence R. Guay, Corporate Social Responsibility, Public
Policy, and NGO Activism in Europe and the United States: An Institutional-Stakeholder
Perspective, 43 J. OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 47, 47, 51 (2006) (stating that others suggest
that NGOS may cause risks of ‘privatizing’ public policies that deal with environmental,
labor, and social issues, thereby leading to a loss in democratic accountability).
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responsible business practices.5 In addition, NGOs create and
institutionalize new norms in society. With the use of social
media and dynamic documentaries, non-profit organizations are
able to successfully network and influence public opinion about
various food safety topics.6 But is it advantageous for the United
States to adopt an institutional process similar to Europe’s,
where non-profit organizations provide input on food law and
corporate responsibility?
This article will assess whether the United States should
adopt an institutional process similar to Europe’s by giving nonprofit organizations a role in shaping food law and corporate
responsibility. Part I provides a comparative analysis of
genetically engineered product regulations in the United States
and European Union (EU). Part II explains how the institutional
processes of the United States and Europe led to the varying
regulations, and demonstrates that the United States institutional
structure is too different from Europe’s to allow NGO’s to have
a role in shaping food law and corporate responsibly. Finally,
Part III asserts that the United States should change its
institutional process by allowing public universities and private
colleges to influence food law and corporate responsibility. This
article concludes that public universities and private colleges
afford collaboration from a diverse group of individuals who are
likely to have both the industry’s needs and consumers’
concerns in mind.

I. The Comparative Analysis of the Institutional
Processes of the United States and Europe Through
the Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods
Genetically engineered (“GE”), more commonly
genetically modified, refers to the genetic modification through
the use of recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (“rDNA”)
techniques to express desired traits.7 The food industry often
5. E.g., Cristina Brandão, et al., Social Responsibility: A New Paradigm of Hospital
Governance?, 21 HEALTH CARE ANAL., 390, 391 (2013) (explaining that a number of
organizations embrace a socially responsible conduct, meaning that citizens, and investors,
are deeply aware that profit and ethical values are not incompatible).
6. E.g., WHAT THE HEALTH (Vimeo 2017).
7. NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
277 (Wily ed., 2d ed. 2017) (asserting that genetically modified, or more precisely
genetically engineered, indicates that humans have directly engineered the DNA). Cf. id.
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creates genetically modified organisms and genetically modified
plants to produce a target trait of a nonrelated species.8 For
example, Calgene, Inc. modified its FLAVR SAVR™ tomatoes
to contain lower levels of a naturally occurring enzyme,
resulting in ripe fruit remaining firm for an extended period of
time and allowing fresh market tomatoes to remain on the vine
longer for enhanced flavor.9 While the technology concerning
GE foods is identical, GE food regulations in the U.S. and EU
vary considerably.10 The United States focuses on the end
product, and the EU focuses on the process.11 This section
delves into the regulatory and labeling requirements for GE
foods in the U.S. and the EU.
(defining conventional plant breeding to mean all breeding methods other than by rDNA
techniques). See generally Rachele B. Bailey, A Tale of Two Systems: A Comparison
Between U.S. and Eu Labeling Policies of Genetically Modified Foods, 15 SAN JOAQUIN
AGRIC. L. REV. 193, 197 (2006) (stating that genetically modified organisms have been
altered in a way that would not occur naturally, allowing selected genes to be transferred
between non-related species).
8. See Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision
Favoring the U.S. Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of Genetically Modified Foods,
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775, 777 (2008) (considering the implications of the precautionary
principle, the role of multilateral environmental agreements, the ability of nations to apply
safeguard measures, and ultimately the appropriateness of the WTO as a body for
determining environmental and food policy). As it relates to food, genetically modified
organisms and genetically modified plants are created when the genes of one organism are
inserted into the DNA of another organism to produce the target trait in that nonrelated
species. Id.
9. Agency Summary Memorandum Re: Consultation with Calgene, Inc., Concerning
FLAVR SAVR™ Tomatoes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Food
/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/GEPlants/Submissions/ucm225043.htm#out2 (last updated
Oct. 13, 2015). When developing the FLAVR SAVR™ tomatoes, Calgene, Inc., a
Californian company, used rDNA techniques to introduce an antisense polygalacturonase
(PG) gene. Id. The PG gene is ordinarily present in tomatoes. Id. The PG gene encodes the
enzyme PG, which is associated with the breakdown of pectin. Id. The principle underlying
the FLAVR SAVR™ tomato was that the antisense PG gene suppresses the production of
the PG enzyme. Id.
10. See Katharine Gostek, Genetically Modified Organisms: How the United States’
and the European Union’s Regulations Affect the Economy, 24 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV.
761, 761-63 (2016) (explaining that the changes to the EU’s regulations will not benefit the
EU’s economy, but changes in U.S. regulations may benefit the U.S. economy); see also
FORTIN, supra note 7, at 486 (asserting that genetically modified organisms and food
derived from genetically engineered organisms have been a contentious matter in
international trade).
11. Jessica Lau, Same Science, Different Policies: Regulating Genetically Modified
Foods in the U.S. and Europe, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS
AND SCIENCES: SCIENCE IN THE NEWS (Aug. 9, 2015), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/
flash/2015/same-science-different-policies/.
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A. GE Food Regulations and Labeling
Requirements in United States
Various federal agencies, such as U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”), the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”), share regulatory oversight of GE products.12 While
various federal agencies have regulatory oversight over GE
foods, the FDA ensures that the nation’s foods, including
products that have been genetically modified, are safe for
consumption.13 FDA asserts that conventional foods and GE
foods pose the same risks; they can potentially contain allergens,
toxins, or anti-nutrients.14 Due to this assertion, GE foods are
regulated in the same manner as conventional foods based on the
doctrine of substantial equivalence.15 In accordance with this
doctrine, any GE crop varieties produced using rDNA
techniques are considered to be essentially the same as the
conventional varieties produced using traditional breeding
methods.16 GE foods are considered to be the same as the
conventional varieties because the substances expected to
become components of food—as a result of genetic modification
of a plant—will be the same as, or substantially similar to,
substances commonly found in foods, such as proteins, fats and
12. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302,
23,302-03 (Jun. 26, 1986) (noting the relevant agencies and their functions in the
administration of the Coordinated Framework). The Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service determines whether a genetically modified plant has the potential to harm natural
habitats or agriculture. Id. The EPA regulates specific genetic modifications that protect
plants from insects, bacteria, and viruses, including plants that have been genetically
modified to contain a pesticide trait. See id. The USDA, along with the APHI, oversees the
release of certain categories of plants and the field testing of Genetically Engineered crops.
Id.
13. See Statement of FDA Mission, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.
gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/reports/budgetreports/ucm298331.pdf (last
visited Sept. 6, 2017). (“FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the
safety, efficacy and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical
devices, our nation’s food supply cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.”).
14. See FORTIN, supra note 7, at 279. Anti-nutrients are natural or synthetic
compounds that interfere with the absorption of nutrients. Statement of Policy - Foods
Derived from New Plant Varieties, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.
gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Biotechnology/
ucm096095.htm (last updated May 2, 2016) [hereinafter Statement of Policy].
15. Maria R. Lee-Muramoto, Reforming the “Uncoordinated” Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 311, 338 (2012).
16. Id.
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oils, and carbohydrates.17 Thus, if the conventional food’s traits
are considered safe, then a GE food’s traits—that are
substantially equivalent—would also be considered safe. For
example, the FDA stated that the genetic modifications for the
FLAVR SAVR™ tomato resulted in nutritional characteristics
that were within the range of existing tomatoes; therefore, the
FLAVR SAVR™ tomatoes were substantially equivalent to
existing tomatoes.18 Based on federal regulations, conventional
foods do not ordinarily require premarket approval.19 Therefore,
the FDA is not required to conduct any independent safety,
allergen, or other tests, to differentiate GE foods from their
conventional counterparts.20
While GE food products are ordinarily exempt from
premarket review and approval, there are instances in which
food manufacturers are subject to premarket requirements. If a
GE food is not substantially equivalent to the conventional food,
then the FDA would require premarket review and approval.21
When GE foods require premarket review and approval, the
products are treated as a food additive and must go through a
food additive review.22 Additionally, the FDA recommends that
17. Statement of Policy, supra note 14.
18. See Jennifer A. Thelen, FDA Regulation of Food and Drug Biotechnology,
LEDA AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8846761
/jthelen.html?sequence=1 (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) (stating that the FDA concluded that
FLAVR SAVR™ tomatoes had not been significantly altered when compared to varieties
of tomatoes with a history of safe use).
19. Cf. 21 U.S.C. 348 (inferring that premarket approval is required for food
additives, unless an exemption from the regulations concerning food additives applies).
20. Lee-Muramoto, supra note 15, at 338 (2012) (declaring that the FDA does not
conduct independent safety or allergen testing, unless the GE food product contains an
allergen that people would not generally expect in that particular food).
21. See FORTIN, supra note 7, at 283 (stating that if a GE-derived food is significantly
different in function or structure, then it is treated as a food additive). To be different from
conventional foods, a food must be different from conventional foods in a meaningful way
or present any different or greater safety concerns than conventional foods. Statement of
Policy, supra note 14. For example, if a food was genetically engineered to include
allergens that the conventional food did not have, then the FDA would not find that the GE
food was substantially equivalent to the conventional food. See Lee-Muramoto, supra note
15, at 338.
22. FORTIN, supra note 7, at 283. Any food additives intended to have a technical
effect in food is deemed unsafe unless it either conforms to the terms of a regulation
prescribing its use or to an exemption for investigational use. Guidance for Industry:
Questions and Answers About the Petition Process, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformatio
n/ucm253328.htm#answerA (last updated July 1, 2016). A petition for a food additive is
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food manufacturers communicate with the FDA even if the
differences between the GE food and the conventional food are
not significant.23
In the United States, labeling of GE products is shared
between various federal agencies.24 Under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act there is no labeling mandate for foods that are
genetically modified.25 The FDA stated that “labels would
erroneously imply that genetically modified foods differ from
conventional foods and that conventional foods are in some way
superior.”26 However, if the composition of a GE food differs
significantly from its conventional counterpart, that information
would require labeling.27 This stems from the misbranding
submitted to request issuance of a regulation allowing new uses of the additive and must
contain the necessary supporting data and information. Id.
23. Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or
Have Not Been Derived from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm059098.htm (last updated July
1, 2016) [hereinafter Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling].
24. See FORTIN, supra note 7, at 293 (stating that the three primary agencies that are
involved with regulating GMO safety, are also involved the labeling).
25. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“Act”) requires labeling because (1) the
labeling is expressly required by the Act, or (2) the information is “material”, as used in the
Act, and the absence of the information is considered misleading under section 201(n) of
the Act. Id. On July 29, 2016, President Obama signed the National Bioengineered Food
Disclosure Standard into law which, in part, directs USDA to establish a national standard
to disclose certain food products or ingredients that are bioengineered. See generally 7
U.S.C.A. § 1639b (West). As a result of the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure
Standard, the regulations issued by the USDA will establish labeling of human food
derived from biotechnology. See id.
26. MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: THE POLITICS OF FOOD SAFETY 145-50, 222
(Darra Goldstein ed., 2010) (discussing the alleged benefits of genetically engineered
foods).
27. 21 U.S.C. 321(n) (proving that labeling is misleading if, among other things, it
fails to reveal facts that are material in light of representations made or suggested in the
labeling, or material with respect to consequences that may result from the use of the food
to which the labeling relates under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling, or under
such conditions of use as are customary or usual). The term “material” is actually not
defined in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Historically, the agency has interpreted the
term, within the context of food, to mean information about the attributes of the food itself.
Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling, supra note 23. For example, FDA has required
special labeling in cases where the absence of such “material” information may: (1) pose
special health risks; (2) mislead the consumer in light of other statements made on the
labeling; or (3) in cases where a consumer may assume that a food, because of its similarity
to another food, has nutritional, organoleptic, or functional characteristics of the food it
resembles when in fact it does not. Id. The FDA does not consider the methods to create
GE food to be “material” within the meaning of “misleading” in section 201(n) as used in
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id.
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provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.28 While labeling
is generally not required by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
manufacturers may voluntarily label their GE food products,
provided that such labeling is truthful and not misleading.29
In conclusion, the United States determines the safety of a
GE food product based on its composition, not the method or
process by which it was produced.30 Based on this
determination, most GE foods are not subject to premarket
review or approval.31 In addition, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act does not require a specific labeling scheme if a food has
been genetically engineered.32

B. EU’s Regulatory Requirements Concerning GE
Foods and Labeling Requirements
Since 2003, the precautionary principle has governed the
EU’s approach to GE foods.33 The precautionary principle is
risk-adverse; because potential risks of GE foods are not
completely known, regulatory decisions require a high burden of
proof for product safety.34 Therefore, in the EU, all GE food
products go through a premarket approval process.35 Companies
of GE food products submit applications for approval to an EU
member state; the centralized European Food Safety Authority

28. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (stating that a food is misbranded if its labeling is false or
misleading in any particular).
29. Labeling of Foods Derived from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/ingredientspackaginglabeling/geplants/ucm
346858.htm (Jan. 1, 2017). In general, an accurate statement about whether a food was not
produced using bioengineering is one that provides information in a context that clearly
refers to bioengineering technology. Examples of such statements include: “not
bioengineered” or “not genetically modified through the use of modern biotechnology.” Id.
30. See Lee-Muramoto, supra note 15, at 338.
31. Id. at 334.
32. Id.
33. See Gostek, supra note 10, at 773.
34. Lau, supra note 11. Precautionary principle refers to preventing not only known
environmental harms and health risks but also to prevent conduct that may be harmful
although scientific evidence is unavailable to prove actual harm. See FORTIN, supra note 7,
at 489 (arguing that precautionary principle creates confusion because there is no standard
definition, and any uncertainty on safety requires prohibition of a potentially harmful or
risky activity until it is proven to be safe).
35. See Lau, supra note 11 (asserting that all GE foods are regulated because they are
made with processes different from those used to produce conventional foods).
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(“EFSA”) then conducts scientific risk assessments.36 After the
EFSA’s acceptance of safety, the recommendation is forwarded
to the European Commission.37 The European Commission
Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection drafts
proposals based on the EFSA’s risk assessment; however, it can
reject or base its proposal on other considerations beyond the
risk assessment.38 A regulatory committee comprised of
representatives of member states’ authorities then decides
whether to accept the proposal through a weighted voting
system.39 If there is disagreement amongst the member states
committee failing to reach a majority decision, then the
European Commission makes the final decision for approval.40
Following the approval, EU regulations mandate that
manufacturers inform consumers that products are genetically
modified through labeling.41 Specifically, a product containing
more than 0.9% GE material must be labeled as being GE
foods.42 Under EU regulation, if a food consists of more than
one ingredient, the phrases “genetically modified” or “produced
from genetically modified (name of the ingredient)” must appear
36. See Sci. Commun. of the Eur. Comm’n, Risk Assessment, HEALTH AND FOOD
SAFETY: SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEES, available at http://ec.europa.eu/assets/sante/health/
scientific_committees/risk_assessment/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) (stating
that the Scientific Committees assess the potential risks before making a legislative
proposal, namely the probability and the severity of an adverse effect, in relation to the
hazards and to the exposure) [hereinafter European Risk Assessment]. Margaret Rosso
Grossman, Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and Feed in
the European Union, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 43, 85 (2005) (inferring that even though the
EFSA conducts risks assessment for GE food products, EFSA has no authority to approve a
product even if the product has been found completely safe). EFSA is an independent
European agency funded by the European Union set up in 2002 following a series of food
crises in the late 1990s which is responsible for risk assessment for food safety. See About
EFSA, EFSA: EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/
aboutefsa (last visited September 4, 2017).
37. See Lau, supra note 11.
38. See European Risk Assessment, supra note 36 (stating that the European
Commission makes a legislative proposal based on the risk assessment, and all other
relevant aspects). For example, the European Commission may authorize a substance,
prohibit a substance, or define exposure limits for a substance. Id.
39. See Lau, supra note 11.
40. See id.
41. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 13 (EC).
42. Id. (“This Section shall not apply to foods containing material which contains,
consists of or is produced from GMOs in a proportion no higher than 0,9 per cent of the
food ingredients considered individually or food consisting of a single ingredient, provided
that this presence is adventitious or technically unavoidable.”).
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in the list of ingredients in parentheses immediately following
the applicable ingredient.43 If the ingredients are designated
categorically, the phrase “contains genetically modified (name
of organism)” or “contains (name of ingredient) produced from
genetically modified (name of organism)” must appear in the list
of ingredients.44 Lastly, if no ingredient list is present, then the
phrase “genetically modified” or “produced from genetically
modified (name of organism)” must be conspicuously on the
labeling.45
In conclusion, the EU’s regulations concerning genetically
modified foods are among the strictest in the world.46 The EU
focuses on the method or process of creation when determining
the safety of a GE food, and not on the final composition. Due to
this determination, all GE foods are subject to premarket review
or approval.47 In addition, all GE foods that meet a specific
threshold are required to meet a specific labeling scheme,
disclosing that a food has been genetically engineered.48

II. The Institutional Structures of the United
States Differs From Europe’s, Which Affects the
Role That NGOs Have in Shaping Food Regulations
and Corporate Responsibly
The regulations of GE foods are different in the United
States and the EU, however, both sides claim that their
regulations were created to address public health and
environmental safety issues.49 Because the purpose behind the
43. Id. (indicating that this information may appear in a footnote to the list of
ingredients, but must be printed in a font of at least the same size as the list of ingredients).
If there is no list of ingredients, then the information shall appear clearly on the labeling.
Id.
44. Id. (indicating that this information may appear in a footnote to the list of
ingredients, but must be printed in a font of at least the same size as the list of ingredients).
If there is no list of ingredients, then the information shall appear clearly on the labeling.
Id.
45. Id.
46. See Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: European Union, LIBR. OF
CONG., https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/eu.php (last visited September
4, 2017).
47. Fact Sheet: Questions and Answers on EU’s Policies on GMOs, EUROPEAN
COMM’N PRESS RELEASE DATABASE (Apr. 22, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-15-4778_en.htm.
48. Id.
49. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 59.
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regulations is the same, assessing the institutional processes of
the United States and Europe that led to the varying regulations
is imperative. This section explains how scientific uncertainties
and ethical concerns played out differently in the EU and the
United States due to institutional and ideational reasons.50
Additionally, this section demonstrates that the United States
institutional structure is too different from Europe’s to allow
NGOs to have a role in shaping food law and corporate
responsibility.

A. The Influences Leading to GE Regulations
The original EU regulations concerning GE products were
very similar to the rules in the United States.51 However, food
safety scares and the rise of anti-genetically engineered food
protests in Europe sent the EU regulations concerning GE foods
in a different direction.52 NGOs reinforced that the EU
regulations should take a different direction.53 Industry tried to
counter the NGOs viewpoint and dissipate the food safety fears,
but industry actions only strengthened the NGOs’ position.54
Europe adopted the precautionary principle based on input from
various NGOs, which assumed the new genetic foods must be
proven safe before introduction into the marketplace.55 The
50. M.J. PETERSON, THE EU-US DISPUTE OVER REGULATION OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ORGANISMS, PLANTS, FEEDS, AND FOODS – CASE SUMMARY, INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF ETHICS EDUCATION IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING CASE STUDY 4
(2010).
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. (stating that the food safety scares included: (1) a fear that humans would
contract “mad cow disease” from English beef, and (2) the discoveries of toxic materials in
Belgian and French animal feedstocks).
53. See, e.g., Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: European Union,
supra note 46 (asserting that NGOs expressed the need to clarify even further that the 0.9%
labeling threshold is not a tolerance level but applies only to the adventitious and
technically unavoidable presence of GMOs).
54. See PAULETTE KURZER & ALICE COOPER, WHAT’S FOR DINNER? VARIATIONS
IN EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 3 (2005), http://aei.pitt.edu/
3092/1/EUSAKurzerCooper05.pdf (“In countries with intensely hostile publics, the biotech
industry, scientific experts, and government officials are outmaneuvered by anti-GMO
voices, who reclaim the debate by introducing new concepts concerning the risks inherent
in experimenting with technological innovations to the country’s food production
regime.”).
55. See Lesley K. McAllister, Judging Gmos: Judicial Application of the
Precautionary Principle in Brazil, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 149, 150 (2005) (stating that the
precautionary principle embraces the idea that full scientific certainty should not be
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EU’s resistance regarding GE foods related to three
environmental risks associated with biotechnology: (1)
genetically engineered traits could harm non-target species; (2)
cross-pollination could cause relatives of the cultivated crop to
inherit the genetically modified trait; and (3) pests targeted by
the genetic modification will evolve resistant.56
While the EU’s regulations were largely influenced by
NGOs, the regulations in the United States were largely
influenced by the food industry.57 US firms developing
agricultural applications of GE technologies formed an effective
nationwide industry lobby.58 The industry based lobbying group
successfully influenced how GE products would be regulated.
In 1986, the Reagan administration set the basic parameters
of the United States’ policy in the Coordinated Framework for
the Regulation of Biotechnology,59 which ensured the
development
of
biotechnology
without
burdensome
regulations.60 Then in 1989, the National Research Council
(“NRC”) published an influential report regarding the safety of
GMOs,61 concluding that “the product of genetic modification
required before governments take preventative action against potentially serious
environmental harms).
56. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), MODERN FOOD
BIOTECHNOLOGY, HUMAN HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT AN EVIDENCE-BASED STUDY iii
(2005); see generally Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty,
and Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVT’L. L.J. 297 (2002) (linking Bt corn
to pest resistance).
57. PETERSON, supra note 50, at 5 (asserting that due to pressures from conservatives
and business interests, the United States’ regulatory approaches for genetically modified
products rely heavily quantifiable estimates of potential harms and benefits used to make
cost-benefit analyses).
58. Id. at 11 (comparing the United States industry lobbying techniques with
European firms; Europe failed to form industry lobbies, particularly at the EU-wide level).
59. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302-03 (Jun. 26, 1986) (explaining that the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation
of Biotechnology encouraged the approach under which the federal agencies in the United
States treated genetic modification the same as other forms of breeding).
60. See Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically
Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C.L. REV. 733, 738 (2003) (reviewing the
development and implementation of the regulatory framework of GE products through
FDA, USDA, and EPA).
61. See Gostek, supra note 10, at 767. The purpose of the National Research Council
is to help improve public policy, understanding, and education in matters of science,
technology, and health. See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING,
MEDICINE, ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160519172226/http://www.nationalacademies.org/nrc/na_0
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and selection should be the primary focus for making decisions .
. . not the process by which the products were obtained.”62 In
addition, NRC concluded that although information concerning
“the process used to produce a genetically modified organism is
important in understanding the characteristics of the product . . .
the nature of the process is not a useful criterion for determining
whether the product requires less or more oversight.”63 Lastly,
the NRC report concluded that “[t]he same physical and
biological laws govern the response of organisms modified by
modern molecular and cellular methods and those produced by
classical methods.”64 The NRC Report was a large step towards
the acceptance of GE products.65
In conclusion, regulations concerning GE foods, as well as
GE food labeling, differ in the United States as compared to the
EU.66 The United States focuses on the end product, while the
EU focuses on the process.67 The varying regulations resulted
from scientific uncertainties and ethical concerns playing out
differently in the EU and the United States. In addition, the EU’s
regulations were influenced by NGOs, and the regulations in the
United States were influenced by industry interest groups.

B. Institutional Structures of the United States and
Europe
EU NGOs’ influence on GE product regulations was
successful; however, NGOs in the United States failed to
influence GE regulations.68 Due to the varying institutional
70358.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2017) (“The Council of the National Academy of
Sciences, under the authority conferred upon the Academy by its charter enacted by
Congress and approved by President Lincoln on March 3, 1863.”).
62. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED
ORGANISMS: FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS 14 (1989), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/1431/
field-testing-genetically-modified-organisms-framework-for-decisions.
63. See id. at 14-15.
64. See id. at 15.
65. Strauss, supra note 8, at 779 (presenting that the US does not segregate from nonGE crops because, in stark contrast to the EU, U.S. law does not require labeling,
segregating, or monitoring of these crops).
66. Id. at 779-81.
67. Lau, supra note 11.
68. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 60-61 (asserting that NGOs in the United
States had not succeeded in extending these adversarial relationships to biotechnology
policy-making). The NGOs in the United States stated their failure to influence GE
regulations stemmed from “a lack of news-grabbing biotechnology”, and failure to use the
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structures, NGOs play a different role in shaping food law and
corporate responsibility in the United States than in Europe.69
Institutional variation between the United States and Europe
emanates from differences in social, political, economic,
historical, and geographic experiences.70
The United States focuses on federal and sub-federal
institutions.71 The focus on federalism and the separation of
national powers stems from a historical experience, emphasizing
a decentralized political structure.72 The resulting decentralized
political system creates numerous access points for NGOs to
influence the government.73 However, NGOs have no formal
standing in the public policy process.74 Therefore, NGOs fail to
successfully lobby in the United States.
While the United States is focused on federal and subfederal institutions, Europe is focused on EU-wide and national
institutions.75 This institutional structure affords NGOs success
when influencing regulation. In addition, interest groups have a
formal place in the policy- making process.76 For NGOs, the
main access points to influence policy-making are the
Commission and Parliament.77 The Commission is the initial
drafter of legislation and welcomes the opportunity to receive
information from lobbyists.78 Lastly, multiparty political
systems exist in most EU member states, making it easier for
judicial system. Id. Note, that NGOs have gained some success in influencing GE labeling
regulations. See generally 7 U.S.C.A. § 1639b (West).
69. See id. at 49 (explaining that the main institutions in Europe and the United States
include political, legal, and social).
70. See generally, NEW DIMENSIONS IN THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
(Harry R. Garvin ed., Bucknell University Press 1977).
71. See Cristina Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional
and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J., 2094, 2096 (2014) (emphasizing that having
many institutions with lawmaking power enables overlapping political communities to
work toward national integration, while preserving governing spaces for meaningful
disagreement when consensus fractures or proves elusive).
72. See id. at 2099-3000.
73. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 52 (2006) (stating that the access points that
were created include the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at the national level,
as well as comparable entities at the state and local levels).
74. GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS: TRANSFORMING BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND
SOCIETY 25 (Jonathan P. Doh & Hildy Teegan eds., 2003).
75. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 49.
76. GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS, supra note 74, at 25.
77. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 53.
78. Id.
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NGOs to form political parties and win seats in the national
legislature than do two-party systems, which exist in the USA
and the UK.79
Institutional variation between the United States and
Europe stem from social, political, economic, historical, and
geographic experiences.80 EU NGOs’ influence on food law was
successful; however, NGOs’ in the United States failed to
influence food law. Due to the varying institutional structures,
public universities and private colleges, rather than NGOs,
should play a role in shaping food law and corporate
responsibility in the United States.

III. The United States Should Allow Public
Universities and Private Colleges to Shape Food
Law and Corporate Responsibility
The United States’ institutional structure is too different
from Europe’s; NGOs cannot successfully shape food law and
corporate responsibility. However, some type of institution or
organization must serve as the counterweight to capitalism and
globalization in the United States. Without that counterweight,
the food industry will lobby the governmental systems,
producing monetary or other private benefits for industry, or
influencing government legislation in ways that undercut any
attempts to serve the broader public interests.81 In addition,
79. PETERSON, supra note 50, at 11 (stating that the multiparty political system
contributes to higher level of environmental consciousness among European voters than the
average US voters).
80. See generally, NEW DIMENSIONS IN THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,
supra note 70.
81. Craig Holmana &William Luneburgb, Lobbying and Tansparency: A
Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Reform, 1 INTEREST GROUPS & ADVOCACY, 75, 78
(2012). The food industry lobbying for its own interests, and influencing consumers, is best
demonstrated through the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA).
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA), Pub. L. No. 103-417,
108 Stat. 4325, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399
(2000)). DSHEA worked to prevent the federal government’s interference with the
supplement industry in four ways. See generally Melissa Card & John Abela, SelfPrescribing a Legal Overdose or Duped into Deficiency? – Should Dietary Supplements
Regulations Be Changed to Avoid Health Adversities? IFIS: FOOD AND HEALTH
INFORMATION, (forthcoming fall 2017). The first means was the expansion of the
definition of a dietary supplement. Prior to DSHEA, dietary supplements were defined as
vitamins and minerals. Id. DSHEA expanded the statutory definition to include herbal,
botanical, and diet products. Id. The second means in which DSHEA prevented federal
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NGOs create and institutionalize new norms in society
promoting what they perceive to be more ethical and socially
responsible business practices.82 The issue becomes which
institution should serve as a counterweight to capitalism and
globalization, and promote ethical and socially responsible
business practices in food law? This section concludes that, in
the United States, public universities and private colleges should
shape food law and corporate responsibilities, rather than NGOs.
This section argues that institutional structures in the United
States include public universities and private colleges, therefore,
public universities and private colleges should have a seat at the
table when it comes to policy-making. Additionally, this section
emphasizes that public universities and private colleges are the
best places for collaboration amongst diverse perspectives to
create solutions addressing industry needs, while also
counteracting capitalism and globalization.
In part, NGOs are ineffective at influencing United States’
law and corporate responsibility because there are too many
access points, and NGOs have no formal standing in the public
policy process.83 However, universities and colleges have a
direct access point to influence food law and corporate
responsibility. University and college members comprise the
Advisory Committees of the FDA.84 The Advisory Committees
provide advice to the FDA Commissioner on specific complex

intervention was that manufactures did not need to prove that their product was safe prior
to manufacturing them. Id. The third means in which DSHEA prevented federal
intervention was that DSHEA grandfathered in the safety of supplements that were
marketed in the United States prior to October 15, 1994. Id. The last means in which
DSHEA prevented federal intervention was that DSHEA allowed supplement
manufacturers to label their products with statements of nutritional support. See also
MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH
(3rd ed. 2013).
82. See Jay Aronson, Non-governmental Organizations Lecture, CARNEGIE MELLON,
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~iliano/courses/07F-CMU-CS502/ lectures/TGD
07-L16-NGO.pdf (stating that the counterweight to the impersonal forces of governmental
bureaucracy and globalization is non-governmental organizations).
83. See Doh & Guay, supra note 4, at 52.
84. Roster of the Science Board to the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/
ScienceBoardtotheFoodandDrugAdministration/ucm115370.htm (last updated June 29,
2017).
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scientific and technical issues that are important to the FDA.85
The Advisory Committees’ advice influences the FDA’s
decisions on various regulations, and provides functions that
support the FDA’s mission of protecting and promoting public
health.86
In addition to having access to the FDA, universities and
colleges are better suited to influence food law and corporate
responsibility because universities and colleges afford
collaboration from a diverse group of individuals who are welleducated, and have both industry’s and consumers’ perspectives
in mind. In fact, universities and colleges can serve the FDA
even better than current advisory committees because
universities and colleges can assess the science, as well as the
economic impact, policy considerations, social injustice
concerns, and legal issues.87 For example, genetic engineering
would have benefitted from diverse viewpoints because GE
foods require people to reimagine the relationship between
science, politics, health, and society.88 Therefore, universities
contain the various disciplines that are necessary to reach a
conclusion regarding science, politics, and society.

IV. Conclusion
Disputes between Europe and the United States over real
and perceived concerns about food safety will continue due to
different perspectives on corporate responsibility and different
institutional processes for settling those differences. While
NGOs are the counterweight to capitalism and globalization, the
United States’ institutional process does not allow for NGOs to
have an influence on food law and corporate responsibility. In
85. Science Board to the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Science
BoardtotheFoodandDrugAdministration/default.htm
(last
updated
May
2017).
Additionally, the Science Board will provide advice that supports the FDA in keeping pace
with technical and scientific developments, and it will provide expert review of Agency
sponsored intramural and extramural scientific research programs. Id.
86. Committees & Meeting Materials, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. https://www.fda.
gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/default.htm (last updated May
2017).
87. E.g., Food Law & Policy, CENTER FOR HEALTH LAW & POLICY INNOVATION,
http://www.chlpi.org/food-law-and-policy/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).
88. KELLY CLANCY, THE POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 4 (2016).
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the United States, public universities and private colleges should
shape food law and corporate responsibilities, rather than NGOs.
The institutional structures in the United States include public
universities and private colleges, therefore, public universities
and private colleges have a seat at the table when it comes to
policy-making. Additionally, public universities and private
colleges are the best places for collaboration amongst diverse
perspectives to create solutions addressing industry’s needs,
while also acting as a counterweight to capitalism and
globalization.

